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ABSTRACT
We present a dynamic general equilibrium model with agency costs where: i) firms are heterogeneous
in the risk of default; ii) they can choose to raise finance through bank loans or corporate bonds; and
iii) banks are more efficient than the market in resolving informational problems. The model is used
to analyze some major long-run differences in corporate finance between the US and the euro area.
We suggest an explanation of those differences based on information availability. Our model replicates
the data when the euro area is characterized by limited availability of public information about corporate
credit risk relative to the US, and when european firms value more than US firms the flexibility and
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huhlig@uchicago.edu1I n t r o d u c t i o n
Is there a special role of banks in lending? How do bank loans relate to non-intermediated
corporate ﬁnance raised directly from the ﬁnancial market? A strikingly robust message from
contemporaneous theories of ﬁnancial intermediation is that banks are more eﬃcient than the
market in resolving informational problems through screening and monitoring. Several reasons
have been put forward: banks have scale economies and comparative advantages in the pro-
duction of information and in debt-related monitoring (Diamond (1984)); they have access to
inside information, whereas debt holders in capital markets have to rely on publicy available
information (Fama (1985)); and banks have better incentives to invest in information acquisi-
tion because of their relatively large stake in the funding of the borrower (Boot and Thakor
(2009)). Empirical studies have conﬁrmed the special role of banks in resolving informational
asymmetries. They have also shown that this role has survived the steady reduction of banks’
lending exposure to a single borrower over the recent decade, through the development of
securitization and a secondary market for loans (Gande and Saunders (2006)).
In this paper, we ask whether a theory that recognizes a special informational role for banks
can account for the behaviour of standard macroeconomic variables as well as the structure of
corporate ﬁnance. In particular, we aim at replicating some diﬀerences between the US and
the euro area in key facts such as the composition of debt ﬁnance, the debt to equity ratio,
t h ec o s to fb a n kﬁnance relative to the cost of bond ﬁnance, the corporate default rate, and
the return to the accumulation of ﬁrm capital.
We cast the informational role of banks into a dynamic general equilibrium model, where
ﬁrms can choose among diﬀerent debt instruments. The model is characterized by three fea-
tures. First, ﬁrms need to raise external ﬁnance in order to ﬁnance production but they have
private information about a productivity factor (as in Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997, 1998), and
Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999), among others). Second, ﬁrms experience a sequence
of three idiosyncratic productivity shocks, the ﬁrst being realized before ﬁrms take ﬁnancing
decisions, and the third determining the default decision. Third, we introduce two types of
ﬁnancial intermediaries — commercial banks, oﬀering bank ﬁnancing, and capital mutual funds
(CMFs), oﬀering bond ﬁnancing. We assume that banks are institutions which have close
relationships with entrepreneurs, acquiring costly additional information about their second
productivity shock and adapting the terms of the debt ﬁnancing arrangements accordingly,
2while market bond ﬁnancing relies on publicly available information about the ﬁrst productiv-
ity shock only. Because banks spend resources to acquire information and arrange ﬁnancing
accordingly, the bond ﬁnancing choice is less costly but also riskier for a ﬁrm than bank ﬁnance.
Our distinction raises the rather fundamental and well-known question of where to draw the
line between a ﬁrm and the market, see Williamson (2002), i.e. what is the diﬀerence between
transactions carried out on the market rather than inside a ﬁrm called a bank? We do not
oﬀer a fundamental resolution. Indeed, if a reader wishes to rather interpret our banks as
rating agencies, to which entrepreneurs pay a fee for a public report before obtaining tailor-
made market bond ﬁnancing based on the reports of the agencies, she could. However, we
interpret these institutions as banks, as the line between markets and banks has to be drawn
somewhere, and as we ﬁnd it reasonable to draw the line here.
We show that, in our model, ﬁrms experiencing high risk of default choose to abstain from
production, while ﬁrms with relatively low risk choose to raise external ﬁnance through bonds.
Only ﬁrms with intermediate degrees of risk choose to sign a contract with banks, because
they value the option of getting further information before deciding whether or not to produce.
This equilibrium feature of our model is in line with theories of corporate ﬁnance arguing that,
because bank loans are easier to renegotiate than corporate bonds, ﬁrms with relatively higher
e x - a n t ec r e d i tr i s kﬁnd the option oﬀered by banks to renegotiate more valuable (Berlin and
Mester (1992)). It is also in line with existing empirical evidence showing that ﬁrms with
relatively higher credit quality (as measured by higher ratio of ﬁxed assets to total assets,
credit rating, and proﬁtability) choose to ﬁnance through public debt, while ﬁrms with lower
credit quality choose to ﬁnance through bank loans (Denis and Mihov (2003)).
Our modelling assumptions also ﬁnd support in the existing literature. The distinction we
introduce between banks and CMFs is consistent with recent theories of ﬁnancial intermedia-
tion. Banks treat diﬀerently ﬁrms in situations of ﬁnancial distress because they are long-term
players in the debt market, while bondholders are not. By acquiring information about ﬁrms,
banks minimize the probability of ineﬃcient liquidation, build a reputation for ﬁnancial ﬂexi-
bility and attract ﬁrms that are likely to face temporary situations of distress (Chemmanur and
Fulghieri (1994)). Our modelling of banks also reﬂects the idea that information acquisition
during the relationship with a ﬁrm leads to greater contractual ﬂexibility relative to the one
oﬀered by ﬁnancial markets (Boot, Greenbaum and Thakor (1993)).
3The contribution of our paper is twofold. First, we embed ﬁrms’ heterogeneity in a dynamic
general equilibrium model where ﬁnancial contracts are optimal, without giving up analytical
tractability. Firms’ ﬁnancing decisions are a function only of the distributional assumptions
about the idiosyncratic shocks and of an aggregate markup variable, which acts as a summary
statistic of the economy. Linearity in the ﬁrm’s net worth allows to aggregate easily across
ﬁrms, so the economy can be described by a system of aggregate conditions similar to those
arising in models without heterogeneity.
Second, we calibrate the model to replicate some key facts about corporate ﬁnance in the
US and the euro area. Some ingredients of our model, such as the degree of heterogeneity
of ﬁrms in the risk of default or the uncertainty that banks are able to disclose about ﬁrms’
productivity, cannot be confronted directly with the data because of limited empirical evidence.
Our calibration procedure oﬀers an indirect estimation of those unobserved characteristics. We
can thus oﬀer an explanation of the documented diﬀerences based on a structural model.
A broad literature claims that corporate ﬁnance diﬀerences are largely explained by legal
systems and institutional settings (see e.g. La Porta et al. (1997)). It is argued that countries
with more eﬀective legal protection of shareholders and creditors (e.g. common law countries
such as the UK and the US) are those where entrepreneurs have higher valuation of securities
and broader access to capital markets relative to countries with lower legal protection (e.g.
civil law countries such as France, Germany and most countries whose legal system is based
on Roman law). Thus, theories of legal determinants would predict - everything else equal -
a larger role of market ﬁnance relative to intermediated ﬁnance, and easier access to equity
ﬁnance, for ﬁrms in the US than in the euro area. These theories also predict that better legal
protection enables ﬁnanciers to oﬀer entrepreneurs external ﬁnance at better terms in the US
rather than Europe.
The empirical evidence - such as the lower share of bank ﬁnance in total debt ﬁnance and
debt to equity ratio in the US relative to the euro area - indeed provides support to the idea that
legal and institutional factors are a major determinant of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancial structure. However,
the data also show that the interest rate spreads on bank loans are higher in the US than in
the euro area, while there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in spreads on bond ﬁnance. This is at
odds with the lower-cost implication of higher legal protection in the US, but we show it to be
consistent with our model, which emphasizes diﬀerences in fundamentals. Our model explains
these diﬀerences as due to relatively lower availability of public information about ﬁrms’ credit
4worthiness and higher need for the ﬂexibility and information acquisition role oﬀered by banks
in the euro area. We therefore view our model as providing an important complement and
addition to an explanation which is based entirely on legal determinants. In this paper, we use
the model to explain the entire US-euro area diﬀerences for several key statistics. While the
truth may lie in between, our exercise shows that a legal determinants theory is not needed to
explain the diﬀerences, and therefore provides an alternative explanation.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we describe the environment. In section 3, we
present the analysis. In section 4, we illustrate the main qualitative properties of the model. In
section 5, we use the model to provide an explanation of corporate ﬁnance diﬀerences between
the US and the euro area based on fundamentals. In section 6, we conclude.
2 The Model
We cast the diﬀerent role of corporate bonds and bank loans into a dynamic general equilibrium
model with credit market frictions, where we maintain the assumption of one-period maturity
of the debt.
The economy is inhabited by identical inﬁnitely-lived households, a continuum of heteroge-
neous ﬁrms owned by inﬁnitely lived risk-neutral entrepreneurs, and two types of zero-proﬁts
ﬁnancial intermediaries (here onwards FIs). Each ﬁrm, indexed by  ∈ [01] starts the period
with some physical capital. It hires additional capital as well as labor, ﬁnanced externally.
Two key ingredients allow to introduce a non-trivial choice of ﬁrms among alternative
instruments of external ﬁnance. The ﬁrst is the existence of two distinct types of FIs, where
banks are willing to spend resources to acquire information about an unobserved productivity
factor, while CMFs are not. The second key ingredient is a sequence of three idiosyncratic
productivity shocks hitting each ﬁrm. The ﬁrst shock, 1 is publicly observed and realizes
before ﬁrms take ﬁnancial and production decisions. The second shock, 2 is not observed
by anyone. Information on the realization of this shock can be acquired by the bank at a
cost, in exchange of an up-front fee paid by the ﬁrm1. The third shock, 3 realizes after
borrowing occurs and is observable to the entrepreneur only. It can be monitored at a cost
1An alternative interpretation is to view “banks” in this model as “consultants”, examining the business
plans of ﬁrms, or to view them as originators of asset-backed securities, by providing screening and monitoring
of applicants. Indeed, the banking sector has moved towards that role in recent years: we view this as consistent
with our model, if enlarged with a market for asset-backed securities.
5by FIs at the end of the period. The ﬁrst shock generates observable heterogeneity among
ﬁrms in the risk of default. The second shock, in combination with the information acquisition
role of banks, provides the rationale for choosing bank ﬁnance for ﬁrms facing high risk of
default. The combination of these two shocks is crucial to generate cross-sectional variation in
ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices. Finally, the third shock rationalizes the existence of risky debt as the
optimal contract between lenders and borrowers.
2.1 Households




 [ln + (1 − )] 0 1 (1)
where  is the households’ discount rate,  is consumption,  denotes working hours and  is
a preference parameter. The households are also the owners of the FIs, to which they lend on a
trade credit account to be settled at the end of each period. They face the budget constraints
 + +1 − (1 − ) ≤  +  (2)
where  denotes the real wage and  the rental rate on capital.
2.2 Entrepreneurs




where  and  denote the ﬁrm-level capital and labor, respectively. The productivity
shocks 1 2 and 3 are random iid disturbances2,w h i c ho c c u ra td i ﬀerent times during
the period. They have mean unity, are mutually independent and have aggregate distribution
functions denoted by Φ1Φ2 and Φ3 respectively. Per independence assumption, these are also
the marginal distributions. The entrepreneur faces the constraint that the available funds, ,
need to equal the costs of renting the factors of production
 =  +  (4)
2Alternatively, one can allow for 1 to be persistent over time, 1 = 1−1 for some ||  1.T h i sw o u l d
aﬀect the analysis via the intertemporal condition (25), since the expectation there would now be conditional on
1. One resolution to this issue is to posit an alternative model of the entrepreneur as dying and consuming
his entire wealth with some constant probability each period, and otherwise saving everything.
6Entrepreneurs are inﬁnitely lived, risk-neutral and more impatient than households. They
discount the future at a rate ,w h e r e is the discount factor of households and 0 1.





  0 1 (5)
subject to the budget constraint
 + +1 = 
 (6)
Here  denotes entrepreneurial consumption, +1 investment in physical capital to be used
in period  +1  and 
 entrepreneurs’ proﬁts in units of output. Because entrepreneurs are
more impatient than households, they demand a higher internal rate of return to investment.
This opens the room for trade between households and entrepreneurs despite the agency costs
of external ﬁnance.
For the purpose of matching the model to data, we interpret the entrepreneurs as the ﬁrm
owners or stock holders. What is crucial here is that entrepreneurs are more informed about
all that is going on inside the ﬁrm than the ﬁnancial intermediaries: an assumption which we
do not ﬁnd entirely unreasonable.
2.3 Agency costs and ﬁnancial intermediation
Entrepreneurs obtain labor and capital inputs from the households against the promise to
deliver the factor payments at the end of the period. Because of default risk, this promise
n e e d st ob eb a c k e du pb yac o n t r a c t u a la r r a n g e m e n tw i t haF I( ab a n ko raC M F ) .T h e
competitive FIs are able to ensure repayment of the factors because they diversify the risk
among the continuum of ﬁrms facing idiosyncratic risk. Since credit arrangements are settled
at the end of the same period, the intermediaries break exactly even on average.





23 for CMF ﬁnance
3 for bank ﬁnance
Firms that decide to raise ﬁnance from banks pay an up-front fee that covers the bank’s cost
of information acquisition about the signal 2 The fee is a ﬁxed proportion  of the ﬁrm’s
value  This cost is not faced by ﬁrms that sign a contract with CMFs, as these FIs do not
7acquire information about the unobserved shock. Hence, the disposable net worth of a ﬁrm at





 for CMF ﬁnance
(1 − ) for bank ﬁnance
Conditional on 1 and possibly 2 each entrepreneur chooses to invest an amount 0 ≤
b  ≤ ˜  of internal ﬁnance and  − b  of external ﬁnance, for total funds at hand of .
Each FI ﬁnances a project whose size is a ﬁxed proportion of the internal funds invested,
 = b  ≥ 1 (7)
This assumption captures the idea that entrepreneurs diﬀer in their ability: the maximal
project size which an entrepreneur is capable of running is proportional to his net worth.
After the realization of the uncertain productivity factor,  the entrepreneur observes
the actual production in units of goods,  and announces to the FI repayment of the debt or
default. The realization of  is only known to the ﬁrm unless there is costly monitoring, which
requires paying a fraction  of the ﬁrm’s output. After the announcement of the entrepreneur,
the FI decides whether or not to monitor. The informational structure at contracting time
corresponds to the costly state veriﬁcation (CSV) framework of Townsend (1979). Restriction
(7) is usually not imposed in the costly state veriﬁcation literature. It is necessary in our model
to ensure that all ﬁrms raise ﬁnite amounts of external ﬁnance despite the presence of ex-ante
heterogeneity: otherwise, only the top ﬁrms would receive ﬁnancing, creating a homogenous
pool of ﬁrms with a potentially high leverage ratio.3
2.4 The timing of events
Entrepreneurs and households enter the period holding respectively capital  and .H o u s e -
holds plan, how much labor to supply, and how much consumption and investment goods to
purchase. They also supply labor and rent out their capital stock. Entrepreneurs calculate
the end-of-period value  of their capital holdings , which is publicly observable. Financial
decisions unfold over three stages.
In the ﬁrst stage, the shock 1 is realized and publicly observed. Conditional on its
realization, entrepreneurs decide whether to:
3This restriction is consistent with the observation of reasonably similar and modest leverage ratios among
rather diﬀerent ﬁrms (see Kurshev-Strebulaev (2006), Table 1).
8a. Abstain from production. Entrepreneurs facing a low 1 decide not to borrow and not
to produce, i.e. they choose b  =0 . They rent out capital on the market, thus retaining their
initial net worth,  until the end of the period.
b. Possibly borrow from banks and produce. Entrepreneurs facing an intermediate realiza-
tion of 1 decide to approach a bank and to postpone their production decision after the
realization of 24
c. Borrow from CMFs and produce. Entrepreneurs facing a high realization of 1 raise
external ﬁnance from CMFs and decide not to acquire information on 2
In the second stage, the shock 2 is realized and not observed by anyone. Information
on its realization is acquired by banks at a cost  and communicated to entrepreneurs.
Conditional on 2 entrepreneurs choose their investment level, i.e. whether to:
d. Abstain from production, in which case b  =0 . These entrepreneurs rent out capital,
retaining their remaining net worth, (1 − ) until the end of the period.
e. Borrow from banks and produce.
Entrepreneurs that have chosen to produce hire labor  and rent capital  from the
households against the promise to deliver the factor payments at the end of the period. This
promise is backed up by the value of their own capital holdings plus the value of the additional
trade credit obtained from the FI (either a bank or a CMF).
In the third stage, the shock 3 is realized and observed by the entrepreneur only. The
entrepreneurs produces  keeps part of output, 
 for own consumption and investment,
and sells the rest to households to settle trade credit. Entrepreneurs announce the outcome of
production and repay loans or default on loans, if they cannot repay the agreed-upon amount.
Conditional on the announcement, the FI decides whether or not to monitor.
At the end of the period, entrepreneurs consume  and accumulate capital +1.H o u s e -
holds use the goods purchased for consumption  and investment in capital +1
4At this point, we could introduce the possibilities for entrepeneurs to enter actuarily fair gambles or,
equivalently, assume that banks are allowed to cross-subsidize projects. As common in the literature, we outlaw
gambling and cross-subsidization. An assumption which can rule out the beneﬁts of such gambles is suﬃcient
risk aversion for the entrepreneurs. This, however, would substantially increase the complexity of the model.
93A n a l y s i s
3.1 Factor prices and the markup
Each entrepreneur’s net worth is given by the market value of the accumulated capital stock,
 =( 1−  + ) (8)
Firms that produce need to sign a contract with the FIs to raise external ﬁnance for total
funds at hand . Normalizing goods prices, the ﬁrm’s demand for labor and capital is derived
by maximizing expected proﬁts subject to the ﬁnancing constraint (4). Denote with E[·] the






1 for CMF ﬁnanced ﬁrms,
12 for bank ﬁnanced ﬁrms.
Also, denote the Lagrange multiplier on (4) as  − 1 Optimality implies that














1 for CMF ﬁnance,










 We can interpret  as an aggregate distortion in production arising
from the presence of agency costs, and  as a ﬁrm-speciﬁcm a r k u pw h i c hﬁrms need to charge
in order to cover the costs of ﬁnancial intermediation. 5
3.2 Financial structure
In our model, the ﬁnancial contract is intra-period but the game between ﬁrms and FIs unfolds
over three stages, each one corresponding to one idiosyncratic productivity shock. We solve
the model using backward induction. In an appendix available from the authors upon request
(henceforth appendix NFP), we provide proofs of the propositions stated in this section.
5In Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998), as in most of the literature, nothing is known before ﬁrms produce, i.e.,
E[123]=1and  = .
10In stage III, ﬁrms and FIs stipulate a debt contract conditional on the available information.


















as the expected shares of ﬁnal output accruing respectively to an entrepreneur and to a lender,
after stipulating a contract that sets the ﬁxed repayment at 

 units of output for
 = . The index  denotes the type of FI, where  indicates banks and  indicates CMFs.




subject to constraint (7) and
(
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b  ≥ 0 (







0 Φ () Equation (7) restricts the project size,6 (13) requires the
FI’s expected return to exceed the repayment to the household, (14) ensures feasibility, and (15)
guarantees that the entrepreneur is willing to sign the contract. Since loans are intra-period,
the opportunity cost of lending for the intermediary is one.
Proposition 1 Under the optimal contract, the entrepreneur either invests nothing, b  =0 
or invest his entire net worth, b  =˜  requiring an amount ( − 1) ˜  of external ﬁnance.
The optimal contract is characterized by a threshold 

= ,s u c ht h a t ,i f ≥  no
monitoring occurs. If , the FI monitors at a cost and completely seizes the resources in







6It is standard in this literature to have the project size (and leverage) optimally chosen by the contract. In
our environment, instead, ﬁrm-level leverage is ﬁxed by equation (7). The reason is that ﬁrms diﬀer in terms
of credit-worthiness. If the distribution of 1 is unbounded, the optimal project size for ﬁrms experiencing
extremely large values of that shock is unbounded. If the distribution is bounded, one typically obtains a corner
solution, with all ﬁnancing going to the best ﬁrms.
11At the beginning of stage II, 2 is realized and not observed. Information on this shock
is acquired by banks and communicated to the entrepreneur, who then chooses whether to
abstain from production or to obtain trade credit and produce.
Proposition 2 A threshold for  = 12 below which the entrepreneur does not proceed
with the bank loan, exists and is unique. It is given by a constant  that satisﬁes
(()) =1  (17)
Condition (17) also determines a threshold for the second ﬁrm-speciﬁc shock. The entre-
preneur does not proceed with the bank loan if 2  (1)
In stage I, after 1 realizes, the entrepreneur chooses whether or not to produce and,
if he does, how to ﬁnance production. For notational simplicity, we drop the subscripts.
The expected proﬁts of an entrepreneur, who proceeds with bank ﬁnance conditional on the











The expected proﬁts of an entrepreneur, who proceeds with CMF ﬁnance conditional on the
realization of 1 is (),w h e r e = 1 and
()=(()) (19)
Finally, the expected proﬁts of an entrepreneur, who abstains from production, is simply .
Note that all payoﬀ functions are linear in net worth . Knowing its own mark-up  = 1,
each entrepreneur chooses the best option, leading to the overall payoﬀ (),w h e r e
()=m a x {1;();()} (20)
In the analysis below, we make the following assumptions: (1) 0() ≥ 0; and (2)
0()  0() for all  = 1 These conditions impose mild restrictions on the parameters
of the model and ensure uniqueness of the thresholds  and 
Proposition 3 Under (A1), a threshold for  = 1, below which the entrepreneur decides not
to raise external ﬁnance, exists and is unique. It is given by a constant  that satisﬁes
()=1  (21)
12Under (A1) and (A2), a threshold for  = 1 above which entrepreneurs sign a contract with
the CMF, exists and is unique. It is given by a constant  that satisﬁes
()=() (22)
Conditional on ,  and , and depending on 1 entrepreneurs split into three sets: Ω,
the set of entrepreneurs that abstain from raising external ﬁnance; Ω the set of entrepreneurs
that sign a contract with banks, and Ω the set of CMF-ﬁnanced entrepreneurs,
Ω = {1 | 1  }
Ω = {1 |  ≤ 1 ≤ }
Ω = {1 | 1  }





1 if 1   or if  ≤ 1 ≤  and 2  1
0 else.

3.3 Consumption and investment decisions
Households maximize (1) subject to (2). Optimality requires that







(1 −  + +1)
¾
 (24)
Entrepreneurs maximize (5) subject to (6), where 








˜  if ﬁrm  borrows and repays, and 
 =0if ﬁrm  borrows and default.
Their optimality condition is given by
1= {(1 −  + +1)(1+1+1)} (25)
3.4 Aggregation
Aggregate variables can be computed by integrating across ﬁrms. Aggregate labor and capital
are given by
 =  (26)
 =( 1 − ) (27)
13Aggregate demand for funds,  output , output lost to monitoring costs 
 , output lost
to banks’ information acquisition 
  and agency costs can be computed as
 =  () (28)
 =  () (29)

 =  () (30)






Aggregate entrepreneurial consumption and investment have to satisfy the constraint
 + +1 = () (33)
where () denote aggregate proﬁts of the entrepreneurial sector.
Notice that  (·)  (·)  (·)  (·) and (·) are functions that aggregate across ﬁrms.
For instance,  () aggregates the costs of information acquisition per unit of net worth across
all ﬁrms that sign a contract with a bank, implying that






The other functions are deﬁned in appendix NFP, where we also derive condition (32).
3.5 Market clearing
Market clearing for capital, labor and output requires that
 =  +  (34)
 =  (35)
 =  +  + 
 + +1 − (1 − ) (36)
Market clearing for loans is ensured by condition (4).
4 Equilibrium properties of the model
We parameterize the model at the stochastic steady state.7 To discuss equilibrium properties,
we use the parameterization of the model calibrated on US data reported in section 5.2.
7The stochastic steady state and the numerical procedure for computing it are described in appendix NFP.
14In Figure 1, we show expected proﬁts for entrepreneurs. Panel (a) plots expected proﬁts
from abstaining, from signing a contract with a bank and from signing a contract with a CMF,
as a function of the ﬁrm’s mark-up, . The intersection points of the three curves provide the
cutoﬀ points,  and .W h e n  the ﬁrm abstains because this provides highest expected
proﬁts. When    the best option is oﬀered by bank ﬁnance, while when  
the ﬁrm chooses CMF ﬁnance. The panel also shows the mean of the ﬁrm-speciﬁcm a r k - u p
 plus/minus two standard deviations. After the realization of 1 95% of the ﬁrms’ markups
lie within this region. Panel (b) shows how expected proﬁts from bank ﬁnance move with the
information acquisition fee When  = 001 information acquisition is so cheap that expected
proﬁts from bank ﬁnance generally exceed those from abstaining or from CMF ﬁnance. The
share of ﬁr m st h a tr a i s e se x t e r n a lﬁnance through banks approaches one. When  is large (04
in the ﬁgure), the option value of acquiring more information is not large enough to oﬀset the
cost. All ﬁrms either abstain or use CMF ﬁnance. Only for intermediate values of  (02 in the
ﬁgure) ﬁrms that decide to produce diﬀerentiate in terms of their ﬁnancing choice depending
on the realization of their markup.
Figure 2, panel (a), illustrates how ﬁrms allocate among ﬁnancial instruments. Firms
experiencing a productivity shock 1 ≤  decide to abstain from production. Firms with
 ≤ 1 ≤  sign a contract with banks Firms with 1 ≥  sign a contract with CMFs.
Among ﬁrms that sign a contract with banks, those experiencing a productivity shock below
the threshold for 2,i . e .2 ≤ 1 decide not to proceed to the production stage. Panel (b)
plots the threshold 1 over the range of mark-ups (), as a function of 1
Figure 3 plots the steady state distribution of ﬁrms among production activities. Firms
that do not produce are those that decide not to raise external ﬁnance because 1 ≤ ,a n d
those that sign a contract with the bank but, after the realization of 2, decide to drop out of
production. For these ﬁrms,  ≤ 1 ≤  and 2 ≤ 1
In our model, key parameters for the determination of the ﬁnancial structure are the
standard deviations of the diﬀerent idiosyncratic productivity shocks, and banks’ information
acquisition costs. For instance, a higher 1 generates thicker tails in the distribution. Firms
experience with lower probability intermediate realizations of the productivity shock 1 before
taking their ﬁnancing decisions. Therefore a lower share of ﬁrms raises bank ﬁnance. Similarly,
a higher variance of the signal 2 implies that ﬁrms value more the possibility of acquiring
additional information through banks. A larger share of ﬁr m sr a i s e sb a n kﬁnance. Notice
15that in our model, a reduction in  acts as an increase in 2 Both a reduction in the cost of
information acquisition and an increase in the dispersion of the private information signal lead
to a larger share of bank ﬁnance.
5C o r p o r a t e ﬁnance in the US and the euro area
5.1 Evidence on the ﬁnancial structure
In our numerical analysis, we aim at replicating six stylized facts: i) the ratio of bank loans to
debt securities, as an indicator of the composition of ﬁrms’ debt ﬁnance; ii) the debt to equity
ratio, as a proxy of the reliance on debt versus equity ﬁnance; iii) the risk premium on loans
and iv) the risk premium on bonds, both reﬂecting the severity of the asymmetric informa-
tion problem in ﬁnancial markets; v) the default rate on bonds, which determines the loss of
resources due to bankruptcy for CMF ﬁnanced ﬁrms; and vi) the expected return on capital,
which restricts in our model entrepreneurs’ proﬁts and their choice between consumption and
capital accumulation.
In table 1, columns 2 and 4 summarize the evidence on the ﬁnancial structure of the EA
and the US, for the period 1999-2007.8 The table shows several diﬀerences. First, bank loans
account for a much larger fraction of debt ﬁnance in the EA than in the US. The ratio of
bank loans to debt securities is approximately eight times larger in the EA (5.48) than in the
US (.66). Second, the debt to equity ratio is higher in the EA (.64) than in the US (.43),
reﬂecting a larger reliance of US ﬁrms on ﬁnancing through equity rather than debt. Third,
corresponding measures of the risk premium on bank loans are higher for the US (170 bps) than
for the EA (119 bps). Fourth, no signiﬁcant diﬀerences can be observed in the risk premium on
bond ﬁnance (143 bps in both the US and the EA). Finally, both the default rate on corporate
bonds and the return to capital are higher for the US (5.37% and 10.9% respectively) than for
the EA (4.96% and 9.30% respectively).
The ﬁrst two facts documented in table 1 are consistent with theories that explain the
composition of external ﬁnance with institutional and legal factors. For instance, La Porta et
al. (1997) analyze the choice between debt and equity ﬁnance, and argue that countries with
legal environments that oﬀer more eﬀective protection of shareholders and creditors are those
8In appendix NFP, we describe the data used to provide evidence on the ﬁnancial structure of the corporate
sector. We also provide analytical expressions for the ﬁnancial variables used in the numerical application.
16where entrepreneurs have higher valuation of securities and broader access to capital markets,
and where ﬁnanciers oﬀer entrepreneurs external ﬁnance (both through debt and equity) at
better terms. They also show that common law countries (such as the UK and the US) protect
both shareholders and creditors more than civil law countries (such as France, Germany and
other european countries whose legal system is based on Roman law).
Thus, theories of legal determinants would predict a larger role of market ﬁnance in the US
than in the EA, in line with the reported evidence on the ratio of bank loans to debt securities.
They would also predict easier access to equity ﬁnance for ﬁrms in common law countries than
in civil law countries, in line with a lower debt to equity ratio in the US relative to the EA. On
the contrary, our ﬁndings on the cost of bank ﬁnance relative to bond ﬁnance in the two blocks
pose a challenge to those theories. Indeed, the average risk premium on bank loans is higher
in the US than in the EA, and no signiﬁcant diﬀerences arise in the average risk premium
on bonds. These ﬁndings are in line with existing studies. On the one hand, Carey and
Nini (2007) documents that interest rate spreads on syndicated loans to corporate borrowers
are signiﬁcantly smaller in Europe than in the United States (by about 30 bps), other things
equal. Moreover, they argue that diﬀerences in borrower, loan, and lender characteristics do
not appear to explain this phenomenon. On the other hand, Mahajan and Fraser (1986), and
Carey and Nini (2007) provide evidence that no signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist in yields between
bonds issued by ﬁrms with similar characteristics in the US and in Europe. We interpret this
evidence as suggesting that theories of institutional and legal determinants are not suﬃcient
to explain the composition of corporate debt ﬁnance.
In the rest of this section, we use our model to sheed light on whether diﬀerences in
fundamentals can oﬀer a complementary explanation.
5.2 Numerical analysis
We search for parameterizations of the model that deliver the best ﬁtw i t hU Sa n dE Ad a t a .
The period is a year. The iid productivity shocks  = 1 2 3 are lognormally distributed, i.e.
log() is normally distributed with variance 2
 and mean −2
2. Both for the US and the EA
models, we ﬁx some parameters to standard values. We set the depreciation rate at  = 07
and the discount factor at  = 96 implying a real interest rate of around 4%.W e c h o o s e
 = 64 in the production function, and a coeﬃcient in preferences  so that labor equal 3 in
17steady state. We also set monitoring costs at  = 15 a value in the middle of the range of
the available estimates (see e.g. Carlstrom and Fuerst (1998)).
For the calibration exercise, it is convenient to specify one of the endogenous variables, ,a s
exogenous and to treat  as unobservable. Thus, we choose six free parameters, 12
and 3 to minimize the squared log-deviation of the model-based predictions on the six
ﬁnancial facts documented in table 1 from their empirical counterparts.9 The parameter values
selected from our benchmark calibration procedure are reported in table 2, columns 3 and 4.
The table also reports some focal statistics (shown in the last four rows), which we use below
to interprete the diﬀerent predictions generated by the US and EA models. The implied
model-based predictions are listed in table 1, columns 3 and 5.
The focal statistics reported in table 2 shed light on the diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial struc-




, is higher in the US (.238) than in the EA (.117).10 The share








 is considerably higher in the EA (0.958) than in the US (0.294), giving banks
and their information acquisition a larger role in the EA. The demand of banking services in
the EA is dampened, however, by a relatively low eﬃciency of european banks. Indeed, the
overall measure of eﬃciency of banks in acquiring information about ﬁrms, 2
2 is higher for





 is lower in the EA (.002) than in the US (.006). The larger
availability of public information in the US allows ﬁrms to better assess their own default risk
and to reduce the output loss induced by agency costs.11
9As a robustness check, we have also run our calibration exercise by using as a target the average default
rate or the default rate on loans instead of the default rate on bonds. In both cases, the match of the model
with the data deteriorates but the results on model predictions and the interpretation of the corporate ﬁnance
diﬀerences suggested by our statistics remain qualitatively unchanged.
10Recent empirical evidence supports this ﬁnding. Using a large panel of ﬁrms over the period 1991-2006,
Bartram et al (2009) show that foreign ﬁrms face lower idiosyncratic risk than comparable US ﬁrms, after
controlling for industry, assets, age, and market-to-book ratio.
11This ﬁnding is also in line with available empirical evidence. Indeed, market-based countries such as the US
have been shown to have higher standards than bank-based countries for information disclosure about ﬁrms,
such as accounting information, income statements, balance sheets, funds ﬂow statements, and stock data (see
e.g. Demirgüc-Kunt and Levine (2001)).
18In table 3, we compare some predictions of the model on variables that were not used as
targets of our calibration procedure to their empirical counterparts. The model generates a
reasonable ratio of aggregate consumption to GDP, +
 , and of investment to GDP, 
 Both
for the US and the EA, the prediction on the average default rate is not far from the oberved
value. The model also predicts that default rates on loans are lower than default rates on
bonds for the EA, in line with the empirical evidence.
The model has two main shortcomings. First, the predicted ratio of the default rate on
loans to the default rate on bonds is higher than one for the US, while it is lower than one
in the data. Second, the model delivers a ratio of entrepreneurial wealth to total wealth, 
,
which is remarkably lower (.25) than in US data (.46).
Predictions of the model on some unobservable characteristics are documented in table 4.
One distinguishing feature is that both in the US and EA models, almost all ﬁrms approach a





 is low, see table 2. The share of ﬁrms that drop-out from production
conditional on having approached a bank ("drop-out if banking") is larger for the EA than for
the US, reﬂecting a higher standard deviation of the relevant uncertain productivity factor (2)
and therefore a higher occurrence of low realizations of 2. The value of the aggregate markup,
 is larger in the US. This is needed to replicate the observed diﬀerence in the expected return
to capital in the US and in the EA. A higher ﬁnancial markup increases the expected proﬁts
of entrepreneurs per unit of accumulated capital stock, because it increases the price charged
by ﬁrms. Finally, agency costs as a share of GDP () are higher in the EA relative to the
US, due to the large use of bank ﬁnance and the consequent impact of information acquisition
costs.
Table 2 shows that the model requires large diﬀerences in information acquisition costs, in
order to replicate the data. One striking diﬀerence arises in the parameter which is .001 for
the US and .028 for the EA. This should be understood as the diﬀerence between bank and
bond ﬁnancing costs: even the EA parameter is small, so that in absolute terms, the US and
EA are fairly similar. However, it is possible that such diﬀerence is needed for the model to
capture the data, because monitoring costs are assumed to be identical despite diﬀerences in
bankruptcy laws and procedures. To verify this conjecture, we checked the robustness of our
results by restricting  in the EA model to take progressively closer values to the one obtained
for the US, and instead endogenizing the monitoring costs . Indeed, the best ﬁt is found for
19a lower level of monitoring costs in the EA,  = 124 and for an information acquisition cost
parameter,  = 005, that is much closer to the one selected for the US While it is diﬃcult to
obtain evidence on monitoring costs in the EA, due to the high heterogeneity in legal systems
and bankruptcy law across european countries, these results are consistent with the perception
that bankruptcy procedures oﬀer higher protection for business debtors in the US (chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code) than in the EA, implying that US banks overall recover a lower
fraction of output. A more detailed discussion of the robustness analysis and of the results
is available in appendix NFP. What matters here is that the model predictions and the focal
statistics turn out to be qualitatively similar for a decently ﬁtting alternative speciﬁcation, and
therefore our interpretation of the corporate ﬁnance diﬀerences remains unaﬀected.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
This paper presents a model where ﬁrms are heterogeneous in the risk of default and banks
have a special role in resolving informational problems. The model can be used to sheed light
on the determinants of key diﬀerences in corporate ﬁnance between the US and the euro area.
Some of the diﬀerences that we document are consistent with theories that point to legal and
institutional factors as major determinant of ﬁrms’ ﬁnancing choices. Some others - such as a
higher average risk premium on bank loans in the US relative to the euro area, and the absence
of signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the average risk premium on bonds - provide a challenge for these
theories. Our model provides a complementary explanation that is based on fundamentals.
We argue that information availability might help to explain the composition of ﬁrms’ debt.
Our calibrated model suggests that diﬀerences in the ﬁnancial structure of US and euro area
ﬁrms can be explained by: i) a relatively low level of disclosure of information about ﬁrms’
credit risk in the euro area relative to the US; ii) a higher need of european ﬁrms for the
ﬂexibility and information acquisition role provided by banks.
20Table 1: Financial facts
US EA
Variable data mod data mod
Bank to bond ﬁnance ratio 0.66 0.67 5.48 5.48
Debt to equity ratio 0.43 0.43 0.64 0.64
Risk premium on loans (bps) 170 169 119 119
Risk premium on bonds (bps) 143 143 143 147
Default rate on bonds (pp) 5.37 5.36 4.96 4.79
Return to entr capital (pp) 10.90 10.93 9.30 9.29
Table 2: Parameter values
Parameters Symbols Model
US EA
Information acquisition  0.001 0.028
Coeﬀ.d i s c o u n tr a t ee n t r .  0.939 0.953
Project size to net worth  1.551 2.102
Standard dev. 1 1 0.037 0.014
Standard dev. 2 2 0.024 0.069
Standard dev. 3 3 0.488 0.335

















Variance private info to info acquisition cost 2
2 0.590 0.168
21Table 3: Additional model predictions and data
US EA
Variable data mod data mod
Consumption to GDP ratio 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.76
Investment to GDP ratio 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21
Average default rate 4.74 5.63 4.25 4.08
Def. rate loans to def. rate bonds ratio 0.80 1.12 0.73 0.82
Share abstain overall n.a. 0.22 0.37 0.40
Entrepr. capital to aggr. capital ratio 0.46 0.25 n.a. 0.24
Table 4: Additional model predictions
Model
Variable US EA
Share abstain 0.028 0.000
Share bank 0.503 0.910
Share CMF 0.469 0.090
Drop-out if banking 0.376 0.444
Aggr. markup 1.041 1.021
Agency costs to GDP ratio 0.004 0.024










































































Figure1. Expected proﬁts and ﬁnancing choices











































Figure 2. Distribution of ﬁnancing choices and threshold for continuing with bank-ﬁnancing.

















Figure 3. Financing choices as a function of observable shocks (1 and 2).
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1P r o o f s
1.1 Proposition 1
Conditions (7) and (15) imply that the expected proﬁts of entrepreneurs willing to produce are
not lower than the utility from disposing of the net worth initially invested. Notice that the
problem is linear in b  Thus, the solution is such that the entrepreneur either invest nothing
and does not produce, b  =0  or invest everything and produce, b  =˜  Entrepreneurs
that produce only raise costly external ﬁnance to cover what is needed in excess of the internal
funds, −˜  =(  − 1) ˜  To realize that equation (16) delivers a unique interior solution to








−1  0 and 0(

)  0






 0 Then, it would be
possible to increase expected proﬁts of the ﬁrm, (

)˜  by reducing 

 while increasing
expected proﬁts of the FI, (

)˜  Hence, 

 could not be a solution to the contract. It
follows that the unique interior solution to the problem is given by (16).
1.2 Proposition 2
An entrepreneur that, upon payment of the information acquisition fee  observes 1 and
2, proceeds with the bank loan if and only if his expected proﬁts exceeds the opportunity
∗Directorate General Research, European Central Bank, Postfach 160319, D-60066 Frankfurt am Main. Ph:
+49-69-13446330. ﬁorella.de_ﬁore@ecb.int.
†Dept. of Economics, 1126 East 59th Street, Chicago, IL 60637. Ph: +1-773-702-8191. huhlig@uchicago.edu.
28costs of renting his capital to others, i.e. if (()) ≥ 1 where  = 12 Notice
that expected proﬁts from proceeding with the bank are zero for  =0and strictly increasing







  0 Hence, a solution to condition (17) exists and is unique.
Moreover, it is constant across ﬁrms and time.
1.3 Proposition 3
Notice that (0) = 1− (0) Under (A1), there is a unique cutoﬀ point  which satisﬁes
the condition ()=1  As u ﬃcient condition for existence and uniqueness of  is provided
by (1) and (2). Both thresholds are constant across ﬁrms and time.
2 Aggregation


















































2 ∗ 3Φ2∗3 ((2 ∗ 3))Φ1(1)






where Φ2∗3 denotes the distribution function for the product  = 23.
Now let  (1 ;) be the average proﬁts per unit of net worth of the bank-ﬁnanced
entrepreneurs, given 1 aggregate information  and the threshold  :














Also, let  (1 ) be the average proﬁts per unit of net worth of the CMF-ﬁnanced entrepre-
neurs, given 1 and 
 (1 )=1 ((1))














The aggregate budget constraints for the entrepreneurs can then be written as equation (33).
3A g e n c y c o s t s
We show that the resource loss due to the presence of agency costs in the economy, 
  corre-
sponds to the sum of the monitoring costs faced by banks and CMFs, and of the information
acquisition costs incurred by banks. For simplicity, we focus on the steady state of the model
and denote steady state variables by dropping the time subscript.





 ()(1 −  + ) and 
 = ()(1−  + ) − 1 Combining the budget constraint of the
household,
 = +(  − )
with conditions  =  +   = +  and  =  () (1 −  + ) we obtain


=  () (1 −  + ) − 


−  + 
From the resource constraint, we can write agency costs as
























Φ1(1)=1  and the deﬁnitions of  () and  () given
in section 2 of this appendix. After rearranging terms, we obtain


=( 1−  + )[ ()+ ()]
implying that  =  + 
304 The stochastic steady state
The unique steady state can be obtained as follows. First, we specify one of the endogenous
variables, , as exogenous and we treat  as endogenous. For each value of  we can then
compute  and  by solving the equations








1={(1 −  + )(1)}
 = 
To compute the overall expected proﬁts (1) given by the steady state version of equation
(25), we use the following procedure. First, under our distributional assumptions about the
productivity shocks 1 2 and 3, we can use some results from the optimal contract literature







()=Φ( − )+ [1 − Φ()]
()=( 1− )Φ( − )+ [1 − Φ()]
where  and Φ denote the standard normal,  ≡
log+052
 and  =  Second, we solve
numerically the condition ( ()) =
−1
 to obtain the function (). The function ()
for bank-ﬁnanced ﬁr m si sd e r i v e db yd e ﬁning  = 12 a n db yu s i n gt h ev a r i a n c e2
3 of
the log-normal distribution. The function () for CMF-ﬁnanced ﬁrms is derived by deﬁning
 = 1 a n db yu s i n gt h ev a r i a n c e2
2+2
3.T h ec u t o ﬀ value for proceeding with the bank loan
is found by solving numerically the condition (()) =1  Using  it is then possible to
compute the expected proﬁts for the bank-ﬁnanced entrepreneur, (),w h e r e = 1.T h e
expected proﬁts for the CMF-ﬁnanced entrepreneur can be computed as ()=(())
With this, it is possible to calculate the overall return () to entrepreneurial investment, the
thresholds  and  and the ratios 
 
 and 
 as given by














where the function  (·) is the steady state version of the function deﬁn e di ns e c t i o n2o ft h i s


















 −1. Then, compute  as  = 


and use it to compute the aggregate
variables  and  Finally, use the steady state version of equations (29) and (33) to
compute  and  and of the resource constraint (36) to compute 
5 Evidence on the ﬁnancial structure
We document diﬀerences in corporate ﬁnance among the US and the EA. The series used for
the EA refer to a changing composition, i.e. they are based on the euro area composition at
the time to which the statistics relate. Our focus is on the EMU period but we only consider
data up to 2007 in order to exclude the major eﬀects of the ﬁnancial turmoil, which resulted
in a sudden drying up of the market for corporate bonds in both the US and the EA.
Ratio of bank ﬁnance to bond ﬁnance. For the US, the average value of loans to
securities over the period 1999-2007 is 0.66. For the EA, the ratio is 5.48, approximately
eight times higher. Data are from Flow of Funds Accounts, Table B.102 on the balance sheet
of nonfarm nonﬁnancial corporations. Securities are the sum of commercial paper, municipal
securities and corporate bonds. Loans are the sum of bank loans, mortgages and other loans and
advances. For the EA, data are from the Euro Area Flow of Funds. Loans are those extended by
monetary ﬁnancial institutions to non-ﬁnancial corporations. Securities are deﬁned as securities
other than shares, excluding ﬁnancial derivatives, issued by non-ﬁnancial corporations.
Debt to equity ratio. T h ed e b tt oe q u i t yr a t i of o rt h eU Sn o n - f a r m ,n o n - ﬁnancial
corporate business sector is 0.43 over the period 1999-2007. For the EA, the ratio is 0.64 over
the same period. For the US, data are from the Flow of Funds Accounts. Debt is deﬁned as
credit market instruments (sum of commercial paper, municipal securities, corporate bonds,
bank loans, other loans and advances, mortgages). Equity is deﬁned as market value of equities
outstanding (including corporate farm equities). For the EA, data are from the Quarterly Euro
Area Accounts. Debt includes loans, debt securities issued and pension fund reserves of non-
ﬁnancial corporations. Equity includes shares and other equity.
32Risk premium on bank loans. For the US, the mean spread between the loan rate and
the Federal Fund rate over the period Jan1999-Dec2007 is 170 bps. For the EA, over the same
period, the spread between the average loan rate and the EONIA is 119 bps. To obtain a
comparable measure of the cost of loans for the US and EA, and because the time period in
our model is a year, we consider loans to non-ﬁnancial corporations (new businesses) with a
maturity interval of below 1 year and with ﬂoating rates. In 2007, these loans accounted for
approximately 86% of total loans to new businesses in the EA and to 92% in the US. For the
US, we use data from the Survey of Terms of Business Lending. For the EA, we use ECB
data from MFI Interest Rate Statistics. Since the series for the EA distinguish amounts of
up to and including EUR 1 million amount, and amounts above EUR 1 million, we compute
average loan rates using relative amounts to build weights. The series on amounts is available
only since Jan 2003. We use the actual weight when available and the average weight over the
whole period otherwise.
Risk premium on corporate bonds. Comparable series for the US and the EA are only
available for the mean diﬀerence between 7 to 10 years corporate bond yields and government
bond yields with a corresponding maturity (ECB data on Financial Market Indicators). Over
the period Jan1999-Dec2007, the mean diﬀerence is 143 bps for the US. Due to the changing
composition of the euro area and the thin market for corporate bonds in the early sample,
reliable data for the EA start in 2002. Over the period Jan 2002-Dec 2007, the mean diﬀerence
is approximately the same in the EA and the US (128 and 126 bps respectively). Therefore,
i nt a b l e1w ea t t r i b u t et ot h ee u r oa r e at h es a m em e a nd i ﬀerence observed in the US. Existing
studies conﬁrm that no signiﬁcant diﬀerences exist among bond spreads in the US and the EA.
Mahajan and Fraser (1986) ﬁnd no diﬀerences in yields between dollar denominated Eurobonds
and US bonds with similar characteristics over the period 1975-1983. Using more recent data,
Carey and Nini (2007) show that mean diﬀerences for A- and BBB-rated ﬁrms among US and
EA remain small even after accounting for duration and currency eﬀects. Gilchrist, Yankov and
Zakrajšek (2009) report mean credit spreads for corporate bonds of short maturity (remain-
ing term-to-maturity of less than 3 years) after grouping them in ﬁve quantiles according to
their expected default frequencies. Although the mean spreads vary substantially with deafult
probabilities, the levels (0.79, 1.03, 1.21, 1.84, and 5.28 percent, respectively) are distributed
around our chosen value.
33Default rate on corporate bonds. Using data from Moody’s, we compute the average
12-months default rate on speculative-grade bonds for non-ﬁnancial corporations. For the
period Jan1999-Dec2007, the average ﬁgure for the US is 5.37%. For the EA, the average
ﬁgure over the same period is 4.96%.
Expected rate of return on capital. We compute the net rate of return of capital as
the gross operating surplus net of depreciation capital as a percentage of total net capital.
This measure of the value of capital service ﬂows for corporations is a broad indicator of proﬁt
developments. In our model, it captures the average expected net return from accumulating
one unit of entrepreneurial capital. Using data from the EU Commission’s Ameco database, we
compute its average value at 10.9% for the US and 9.3% for the EA, over the period 1997-2005.
The model oﬀers some additional model predictions (not used as targets in the estimation
procedure) that can be compared with the data. We document here the evidence presented in
tables 3 and 4.
Ratio of aggregate consumption to GDP. The ratio is 0.85 for the US and 0.77 for
the EA. Data are for the period 1999-2007 from ESA95 national accounts.
Ratio of aggregate investment to GDP. The ratio is 0.19 for the US and 0.21 for the
EA. Data are for the period 1999-2007 from ESA95 national accounts.
Average default rate. The annual rate is 4.74 percent for the US and 4.25 percent
for the EA. We measure the average default rate with Moody’s 12-months default rate by
speculative-grade rated non-ﬁnancial corporations, over the period January 1999 to December
2007.
Ratio of default on loans to default on bonds. It is 0.80 for the US and 0.73 for
the EA. The numbers are taken from Emery and Cantor (2005). Based on an analysis of 582
non-ﬁnancial corporates between Jan1995 and Jun2003, they ﬁnd that in the US the default
rate on loans is lower than the default rate on bonds by approximately 20%. Similar results
are found for european ﬁrms. Using data on 29 european non-ﬁnancial corporate issuers, the
approximate reduction in the loan default rate relative to the bond default rate is 27%.
Share abstain overall. We use data from the ENSR Entreprise Survey 2002 to sheed
light on the share of ﬁr m st h a td on o tr a i s ee x t e r n a lﬁnance. The ENSR survey collects data
on small and medium size european entreprises (representing 99.8% of total entreprises in the
EA). It is documented that, during the three years previous to the survey, 37 percent of the
ﬁrms considered did not request a bank loan. Given the size of these ﬁrms, it is unlikely
34that they would ﬁnance themselves on the market if they do not do so through banks. We
therefore take this number as providing indirect evidence on the share of ﬁrms that does not
raise external ﬁnance.
Firms’ capital as a share of aggregate capital. Based on US data from the 2004
Survey of Consumer Finances, Sandri (2009) documents that entrepreneurs own around 46%
of total wealth.
6 Financial variables
We provide analytical expressions for the ﬁnancial variables used in the numerical application.
The ratio of bank ﬁnance to bond ﬁnance, Υ is deﬁned as the ratio of the funds raised
by bank-ﬁnanced ﬁrms to the funds raised by CMF-ﬁnanced ﬁr m s . T h ea m o u n to fe x t e r n a l







The average risk premia for bank-ﬁnanced ﬁrms and CMF-ﬁnanced ﬁrms are denoted re-
spectively as 
 and 
 Given the solution to the contract, () the risk premium for a
ﬁrm  that chooses to raise external ﬁnance from intermediary  





)( − b )=

 = 










































The aggregate debt to equity ratio  is deﬁned as the ratio of all debt instruments used
by producing ﬁrms to the aggregate net worth of existing ﬁrms,







35The default rate on bank loans, ∆
 is deﬁned as the share of ﬁrms which approaches banks





















Similarly, the default rate on bonds, ∆
 is given by the share of ﬁrms which borrow from












Average default amounts to the share of ﬁrms which sign a contract with either a bank or a
CMF but cannot repay the debt.
The gross expected return on equity is measured by (1−+)(1)= 1
 Our target for
a net expected return on equity, 






7 Robustness analysis: an alternative choice for  and .
The results reported in the paper (table 2, column labelled “mod”) show that the model
requires diﬀerent information acquisition costs, in order to replicate US and EA data. The
parameter  is .001 for the US and .028 for the EA. In the paper, we argue that such diﬀerence
may be needed for the model to capture the data, because monitoring costs are assumed to be
identical despite diﬀerences in bankruptcy laws and procedures.
In order to check the robustness of our results, we have investigated alternative parameters.
More speciﬁcally, we have maintained the monitoring costs  for the US at .15 (in line with
available empirical evidence), while allowing the calibration procedure for the EA to select the
monitoring parameter, using the parameters of the US model as initial values, and restricting
 to take progressively closer values to the one obtained for the US.
The columns labelled “data”and “model EA” in tables A1 to A4 coincide with the results
presented in the paper, whereas the columns labelled “model EA1” provide the alternative
calibration. Indeed, the best ﬁt is found for a lower level of monitoring costs,  = 124 and for
an information acquisition cost parameter that is much closer to the one selected for the US,
36i.e.  = 005 Nonetheless, the ﬁt of “model EA1” with the data is worse than the one oﬀered
by the benchmark EA model: numerically, it appeared to be very diﬃcult to get closer to the
data, when restricting  to values similar to those selected by the numerical procedure for the
US. Note, though, that the model predictions and the focal statistics are qualitatively similar:
we interpret this is as a sign of robustness of our results. Therefore, our interpretation of the
corporate ﬁnance diﬀerences remains valid under this alternative parameterization.
As a further robustness check, we also attempted to solve for the model by equating the
value of  in the EA to the value of 0.001 in the US, and solve for . We then had considerably
greater numerical diﬃculty to match the observed facts than already emanate from the column
labeled “model EA1”. We suspect that the rather intricate nonlinearities in these six equations
may prevent the system to have a solution at all: there obviously is no reason to expect a
nonlinear system of six equations in six unknowns to have a solution. The same problem may
be the reason underlying the apparent worsening ﬁt in the column “model EA1”. While this
may be an interesting issue that could be explored further, it is an issue that leads us rather
far astray from the main focus of the paper.
Table A1: Financial facts
Variable data US mod US data EA mod EA mod EA1
Bank to bond ﬁnance ratio 0.66 0.67 5.48 5.48 5.48
Debt to equity ratio 0.43 0.43 0.64 0.64 0.63
Risk premium on loans (bps) 170 169 119 119 126
Risk premium on bonds (bps) 143 143 143 147 132
Default rate on bonds (pp) 5.37 5.36 4.96 4.79 5.01
Return to entr capital (pp) 10.90 10.93 9.30 9.29 9.28
37Table A2: Financial predictions
Parameters Symbols Model
US EA EA1
Monitoring costs  0.150 0.150 0.124
Information acquisition  0.001 0.028 0.005
Coeﬀ.d i s c o u n tr a t ee n t r .  0.939 0.953 0.953
Project size to net worth  1.551 2.102 1.784
Standard dev. 1 1 0.037 0.014 0.003
Standard dev. 2 2 0.024 0.069 0.031
Standard dev. 3 3 0.488 0.335 0.405
Overall variance unobserved shocks
P3
=2 2
 0.238 0.117 0.165












 0.006 0.002 0.000
Variance private info to info acquisition cost 2
2 0.590 0.168 0.190
Table A3: Additional model predictions and data
Variable data US mod US data EA mod EA mod EA1
Consumption to GDP ratio 0.85 0.78 0.77 0.76 0.78
Investment to GDP ratio 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22
Average default rate 4.74 5.63 4.25 4.08 4.87
Def. rate loans to def. rate bonds ratio 0.80 1.12 0.73 0.82 0.97
Share abstain overall n.a. 0.22 0.37 0.40 0.19
Entrepr. capital to aggr. capital ratio 0.46 0.25 n.a. 0.24 0.21
38Table A4: Additional model predictions
Model
Variable US EA EA1
Share abstain 0.028 0.000 0.000
Share bank 0.503 0.910 0.875
Share CMF 0.469 0.090 0.125
Drop-out if banking 0.376 0.444 0.216
Aggr. markup 1.041 1.021 1.031
Agency costs to GDP ratio 0.004 0.024 0.006
39